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MAKING SENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ISSUES FOR THE TRIER OF FACT
DAVID J. IGNALLS

At common law, executive, legislative, and judicial officials enjoyed

some form of immunity from suit based upon their official actions.'
"[Public officers require this protection to shield them from undue
interference
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability." 2 In the United States, certain officers generally retain absolute
immunity, such as the President,3 legislators performing legislative functions,4 judges, 5 prosecutors, 6 and executive officers engaged in adjudicative

functions. 7 Other government officials receive only qualified or good-faith
immunity. 8
As a general rule, government officials claiming qualified immunity are
entitled to a pretrial determination of their immunity, most commonly in the
form of a motion for summary judgment.9 In certain instances, however,
government officials cannot take full advantage of their immunity because of
the difficulty in determining, on a motion for summary judgment, issues that
could be for the jury. This article will outline the problems with using
summary judgment motions to raise the defense of qualified immunityspecifically, the confusion between qualified immunity and liability on the
merits. To highlight the problem, the article focuses on cases involving

* Associate, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C. J.D., The College of William
and Mary, 1991; B.A., Cornell University, 1987. The article does not necessarily represent
the opinion of Wiley, Rein & Fielding.
1. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
2. Id.
3. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975).
5. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978).
6. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-12 (1978). But cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113
S. Ct. 2606, 2612 (1993) (holding that prosecutors are not absolutely immune for fabricating
evidence or making false statements at a press conference).
7. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-17.
8. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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police officers alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment and prison 0
officials who are accused of denying medical or psychiatric care to suicidal
inmates.
In such cases, the standard for determining liability is vague enough that
police officers and prison officials often are not able to obtain a pretrial
determination of their immunity. The distinction between qualified immunity
and liability on the merits frequently is lost because courts grant qualified
immunity only when it is clear that the defendant could not be liable on the
merits. Qualified immunity, like any other immunity, however, is meaningful
only when the beneficiary is shielded from liability that would otherwise
attach to his conduct.
Two possible scenarios exist in which the general summary judgment
rules lead to results at odds with the purposes underlying qualified immunity-i.e., to protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.""I In the first instance, the underlying facts are not in
dispute, but a jury question exists over whether those facts amount to a
constitutional violation. This problem is particularly acute in prison medical
care and Fourth Amendment cases because the standards-deliberate
indifference and probable cause-often create a jury question even on
undisputed facts.' 2 In the second instance, there is a genuine factual dispute.
For example, the plaintiff says the defendant gave the inmate the rope to
hang himself, but the defendant denies that he gave the inmate the rope. In
this situation, summary judgment is generally inappropriate. If, however, the
defendant ultimately proves to the trier of fact that he did not violate the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, was it just to require the defendant to go to
trial? 3
When qualified immunity is raised as a defense by a government
official,' 4 the issue before the court with respect to that defendant should
become qualified immunity, not the merits of the alleged constitutional
violation. As to the first instance-in which the evidentiary facts are not in
10. As used in this article, "prison" denotes both prisons and jails.
11. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

12. This is similar to negligence cases in which the trier of fact determines whether the
defendant's conduct was reasonable, even if the facts are not in dispute. E.g., Davidson v.
Stanadyne, Inc., 718 F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that summary judgment is rarely
appropriate in negligence cases even if the facts are not in dispute). But cf. Lampkin v. City
of Nacogdoches, 7 F. 3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1993) (error to hold that the objective reasonable-

ness prong of the qualified immunity standard is generally a factual question for the jury).

13. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). One rationale of qualified
immunity is to avoid the expense of litigation and the diversion of official energy. Id. at 814.
14. Qualified immunity is not available to private defendants. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S.Ct.
1827, 1834 (1992). As to government defendants, qualified immunity is available only for
performance of discretionary functions. See, e.g., Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1346
(lth Cir. 1991). For purposes of this argument, this article does not go into the issue of
whether the defendant's actions were within the scope of his discretionary functions. Such a
discussion would merit its own article. This article assumes that the actions forming the basis
of the lawsuit were within the defendant's discretionary authority such that the defendant may
raise the defense of qualified immunity.
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dispute-if a jury question exists as to liability, then the individual defendant
should be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.
If reasonable minds, including the defendant's, could differ about the legality
of the defendant's actions, the defendant could not have violated a clearly
established right of the plaintiff's. If reasonable minds could not differ as to
the illegality of defendant's conduct, the defendant is not entitled to qualified
immunity, and the plaintiff would necessarily prevail as a matter of law.
As to the second instance-in which the evidentiary facts are in disputethe plaintiff should have the burden to produce evidence in support of a
motion for summary judgment that, if uncontroverted, would entitle him to
a judgment as a matter of law as the law existed at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation."5 If the issue of qualified immunity is not decided
on summary judgment, the court should submit the issue of qualified
immunity to the jury; the plaintiff would prevail at trial only if he could
prove facts from which reasonable minds could not differ concerning the
illegality of defendant's conduct. Any doubt as to the legality of defendant's
conduct would be resolved in favor of the defendant.
GENERAL STANDARD ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In all civil cases, including those in which qualified immunity is an
issue, the court may grant summary judgment only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 16 A defendant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law unless the plaintiff, the nonmovant,
demonstrates that a genuine dispute exists as to an element of the plaintiff's
case on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.17 When deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence to
determine the truth of the matter, but must simply determine whether there
is an issue for trial.18 If a reasonable factfinder could draw more than one
inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of
material fact, then the court may not grant summary judgment.'

15. The conduct must be judged according to law as it existed at the time of the alleged
violations. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-65 (1978). If, based on the
plaintiffs evidence alone, reasonable minds could differ as to whether defendant's conduct was
illegal, the defendant should be entitled to qualified immunity.
16. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
17. Id. The burden of proof on the issue of qualified immunity is not clearly defined. See
infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
18. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988);
Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979).
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Although issues of qualified immunity "ordinarily should be decided by

the court long before trial,"' the summary judgment standard is designed
to weed out only cases in which there are no genuine issues of fact for the
jury. The Supreme Court having never ruled directly on the issue, the
determination of qualified immunity, in certain circuits, can be an issue of
fact for the jury.2 Ideally, the issue of qualified immunity should not
survive to trial. Indeed, if the case goes to the jury, much of the immunity
is lost because the defendant has had to go through the expense and
inconvenience of litigation.'
In certain cases, summary judgment may be an adequate means to
protect the qualified immunity of individual government officials.' In cases
involving prison suicides and searches or seizures without probable cause,
however, the standard rules as currently applied are inadequate to give
government officials the full benefit of their qualified immunity because the
existence of an issue of fact concerning liability often prevents a court from
granting summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. A defendant
often obtains judgment on the issue of qualified immunity only when he has
not violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and would be entitled to
judgment on the merits.
GENESIS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNrrY

In Scheuer v. Rhodes,24 the Supreme Court had to determine what
immunity from suit, if any, to which state officials, including the Governor
of Ohio, would be entitled. The court of appeals held that the Governor and

20. Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
527-29 (1985)); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
21. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1992); Thorsted v. Kelly, 858
F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1988); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 1984);
Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1984); B.C.R. Transport Co. v. Fontaine,
727 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1984); McElveen v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d 954, 95658 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); see also Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560,
1576 (7th Cir. 1985) (Coffey, J., dissenting in part). But see Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d
1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985); Trejo
v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 486-88 (5th Cir. 1982).
22. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (determining that the essence of
immunity is the possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages
action).
23. For example, a public employee who has a property interest in his job has a constitutional right to procedural due process before he may be terminated. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-79 (1972). Because the specifics of what process is due are unclear,
see, e.g., id. at 570 n.7 ("some kind of hearing required"); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (indicating that the determination of due process requires a balancing of
the competing interests of the employee and the government that are implicated in the
termination decision), government employer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless
the employee can show that the employee's right to due process was clearly established. See
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) ("Officials sued for constitutional violations do not
lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or
administrative provision.").
24. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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other state officers had absolute immunity.' After determining that government officers need some form of immunity,' the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that unlike judges and legislators, executive officers have no absolute
immunity,' but are immune from liability only if acting in good faith.28
The rationale for such immunity is:
1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position,
to exercise discretion, [and] 2) the danger tat the threat of such liability
would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and
29
judgment required by the public good.

The issue having been raised on a motion to dismiss in the district court, the
Supreme Court did not determine whether, and under what circumstances,
the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity, but remanded the
case to the district court for further factual development."0
Eight years later, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald," the Supreme Court
elaborated on the standard that courts must use to determine whether
individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Because one rationale
for qualified immunity is to avoid the expense of litigation and the diversion
of official energy,32 "public policy . . . mandates an application of the

qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial
claims without resort to trial." 33 A standard that used the subjective good
faith of the defendant would invariably create a jury question that would
preclude summary judgment.'
In the interest of allowing defendants to raise the defense of qualified
immunity successfully before trial, the Court held that "government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."35 Because a court would base its determination on objective
factors, the question of whether a defendant would be entitled to qualified
immunity would be a question of law that the court could determine on a
motion for summary judgment.36 As Justice Brennan noted in his concur25. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 442 (6th Cir. 1972).
26. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240-42.
27. Id. at 243-44.
28. Id. at 247-48.
29. Id. at 240.
30. Id. at 250.
31. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
32. Id. at 814.
33. Id. at 813.
34. Id. at 816.
35. Id. at 818.
36. See id. at 819.
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rence, however, even with the objective standard, some discovery may be
required.37 Thus, even though the court might grant summary judgment,
government officials could still be saddled with the expenses of litigation and
the diversion of official energy.
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,38 the Supreme Court made clear that qualified
immunity protects individuals from suit, not just liability. The Court held that
the denial of a motion for summary judgment for qualified immunity is an
appealable collateral order 9 because the defendant's right not to stand trial
would be forever lost if not determined before trial.' Summary judgment
is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to produce evidence that the defendant
committed an unconstitutional act. a" The Court further made clear that the
question of whether the defendant's actions were clearly unconstitutional
must be made in the context of the law at the time of the alleged constitutional deprivation.42
The contours of qualified immunity were further refined in Anderson v.
Creighton,43 in which the Court reasoned that the determination of whether
a constitutional right was clearly established depended on the specific facts
of the case, not broad generalizations of constitutional law. 4 In Anderson,
an FBI agent conducted a warrantless search of a residence because the agent
believed that a man suspected of committing a bank robbery earlier in the
day was at the residence.45 After the homeowners filed suit, the agent
moved for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. 6
The district court granted summary judgment, holding that the undisputed facts revealed that the agent had probable cause to search and that his
failure to obtain a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances.47 The
court of appeals reversed, determining that unresolved issues of fact made it
impossible to determine whether the search had been supported by probable
cause and exigent circumstances. 4 The court of appeals held that the agent
was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right he allegedly

37. See id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

39. Id.at 525-26.
40. "The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and
like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."
Id. at 526.

41. See id.
42. See id.at 535. Although the plaintiff must show a violation of clearly established law,
the court must determine what the law was at the time of the violation. See Elder v. Holloway,
62 U.S.L.W. 4149 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1994).
43. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).

44. See id. at 640 n.2.
45. Id.at 637.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.at 637-38.
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violated-the right to be free from unreasonable searches-was clearly
established.49
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that law enforcement
officers who reasonably, but mistakenly, conclude that probable cause is
present should not be held personally liable.' As the Court had previously
noted, police officers applying for warrants are immune if a reasonable
officer could have believed that there was probable cause to support the
application." The relevant question with which to determine qualified
immunity is whether a reasonable officer could have concluded that the
search in question was lawful.5 2 If reasonable doubt about the legality of the
search exists-based on the undisputed facts, the defendant would be entitled
to summary judgment on his defense of qualified immunity. 3

Although there is a societal interest in giving qualified immunity to
government officials, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. 4 Thus,
the bad faith of the defendant is generally not an element that the plaintiff
must plead" in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.56 The burden of proof
on qualified immunity, however, presently is unclear. Prior to Harlow and
Anderson, the burden of proof was on the government official to prove
entitlement to immunity.58 Since the Court changed the standard for

determining entitlement to qualified immunity, it has remained silent on the
issue of the burden of proof.

49. Id. at 638.
50. Id. at 641 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986)).
51. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986).
52. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
53. Id.; see also Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991) ("Immunity ordinarily should
be decided by the court long before trial" if the defendant could reasonably have believed
probable cause existed). But see Navarro v. Barthel, 952 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991)
(question for jury whether defendant's actions were reasonable in carrying out search), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1920 (1992).
54. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-42 (1980).
55. The Supreme Court has, however, left open the possibility that the defense of qualified
immunity could require heightened pleading on the part of persons suing government officials.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993).
56. Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639-40. Qualified immunity is equally available to federal officials
sued pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See, e.g.,
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
57. See, e.g., Guffey v. Wyatt, 1994 WL 70532, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 1994) ("when
a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish the defendant
violated clearly established constitutional rights;" to obtain summary judgment, the defendant
would then have the burden to prove that "no material issues of fact remain as to whether the
defendant's actions were objectively reasonable.").
58. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
506 (1978)).
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ProbableCause
In some cases, the broad standard for determining whether a police
officer is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to probable cause for a
search or arrest does not allow the officer to avoid the expense and energy
of a trial. In Malley v. Briggs,59 the Supreme Court considered the imimunity of a police officer who allegedly applied for a search warrant without
probable cause. The Court reiterated the broad scope of qualified immunity,' yet remanded the case for trial. As Justice Powell noted in his partial
dissent, summary judgment as to qualified immunity is appropriate if
reasonable officers in the defendant's position could disagree about whether
probable cause for a search existed.61 In this situation, summary judgment
should have been granted on the issue of qualified immunity, although such
a doubt about the existence of probable cause would preclude summary
judgment on the underlying issue of whether the defendant's conduct was
unconstitutional.62
Because the standard for determining probable cause is similar to that for
determining qualified immunity-i.e., reasonableness-some courts treat the
lack of probable cause to search or arrest as a basis to deny qualified
immunity.63 Because the right to be free from searches and seizures without
probable cause has been long established, a police officer will have difficulty
arguing that the law making his conduct unconstitutional was not clearly
established at the time of the arrest or search. Thus, a court could conclude,
as did a panel of the Seventh Circuit, that the issue of whether an arrest was
without probable cause is one and the same with the issue of whether the
arresting officer would be entitled to qualified immunity. 4
In Mahoney v. Kesery,65 after asserting that the issue of liability and
qualified immunity is one and the same, Judge Posner stated that district
courts have two options to resolve the question of the officer's immunity: the

59. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
60. Id. at 341 (reasoning that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law").
61. Id. at 349 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority opinion
states that "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree, immunity should be
recognized." Id. at 341. "Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indication of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable, will the shield of
immunity be lost." Id. at 344-45 (citation omitted). Phrased differently, the police officer gets

no immunity if no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant. Id. at
346 n.9.
62. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (finding that officers may
reasonably, but mistakenly, believe probable cause exists).
63. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. 1992); Llaguno v.
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. See, e.g., Mahoney, 976 F.2d at 1057.

65. 976 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
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court could hear the evidence and then rule on the question of immunity, or
the jury could rule on the issue.66 This assumes that the jury is competent
to rule on the question of qualified immunity. 7 Either option effectively
prevents the defendant from successfully raising the shield of qualified
immunity before trial, making qualified immunity available only when no
liability exists.
The law of other circuits concerning the assertion of qualified immunity
by police officers charged with unreasonable arrests or searches makes it
difficult for the defendant to raise the issue successfully before trial. In the
Ninth Circuit, the burden is on the defendant to prove that his conduct was
justified by an objectively reasonable belief that his actions were lawful under
existing law.6" If there are issues of fact concerning the reasonable belief of
the defendant that the search is lawful, the immunity issue, as well as that of
liability, is for the jury.69
In Golino v. City of New Haven,7" the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment on the question of
qualified immunity. The plaintiff, who had been arrested for a notorious
murder, sued various city defendants, including the officers who applied for
the arrest warrant, for malicious prosecution. 7 After determining that a
malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an arrest or prosecution
without probable cause, the district court held that it could not rule as a
matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that
their actions were lawful.' In affirming, the court of appeals held that to
get summary judgment, the officer must adduce facts so that no reasonable
jury, viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could
conclude it objectively unreasonable for the officer to believe probable cause
existed.73
Courts that view qualified immunity as a question of law are not
necessarily more sympathetic to the police officer alleged to have made an
arrest or search without probable cause. In the Eleventh Circuit, the issue of
66. Id. at 1058. In Mahoney, the district court judge followed the first alternative. Id.
Because both the judge and jury reached the same conclusion that the officer's arrest was
unreasonable-i.e., without probable cause, Judge Posner did not state which alternative he
preferred. Id. at 1059.
67. But see Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991); Llaguno v. Mingey,
763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985); Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 486-88 (5th Cir. 1982).

68. See Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
69. Id. (citing Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1984)). In this case, there
was no dispute over defendant's conduct, yet the defendant never moved to dismiss or for
summary judgment. Id. at 572.
70. 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992).
71. Id. at 866.
72. Golino v. City of New Haven, 761 F. Supp. 962, 971-72 (D. Conn.), 4'd, 950 F.2d

864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992).

73. Golino, 950 F.2d at 870 (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)). In
Golino, there were disputed facts concerning whether the officers deliberately misrepresented
facts to the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant.
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qualified immunity is a question of law to be determined on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment. 74 To avail himself of qualified immunity, the defendant must prove
that his wrongful actions were within his discretionary authority.' The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove lack of good faith.76 "[O]nce the
defense of qualified immunity has been denied pretrial due to disputed issues
of material facts, the jury should determine the factual issues without any
mention of qualified immunity." r Thus, if the plaintiff can survive the
motion for summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of material fact,
the defense of qualified immunity 78would be lost forever if the defendant has
no further opportunity to raise it.
The Eighth Amendment Right to Medical/PsychiatricCare
The guarantee of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual
punishment protects prison inmates against unnecessary infliction of pain and
suffering. 79 "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment." 8 This indifference may be manifested by prison
doctors in response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Pretrial detainees have
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment at least equivalent to those enjoyed
by convicted persons under the Eighth Amendment.'
The right to be free from deliberate indifference with respect to serious
medical needs encompasses the right to care for serious psychiatric needs.'
Accordingly, prison officials who display deliberate indifference to the
psychiatric needs of a suicidal prisoner or detainee may be liable if the

74. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Bennett v. Parker,
898 F.2d 1530, 1535 n.2 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991)).

75. Id. at 1346.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1348.
78. However, some courts, without addressing specific procedures, have held that the
defense of qualified immunity can be raised at any time, including trial. Dixon v. Richer, 922
F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1991) (the defendant may reassert the defense at trial after factual
disputes are resolved); Figeroa-Rodriguez v. Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037, 1041 n.5 (1st Cir. 1988).
79. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
80. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

81. Id. at 104-05.
82. See, e.g., Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Bowen v.
City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1992); Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1243
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1986); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1294 (4th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).

83. See, e.g., Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1990); Wellman v.
Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984),
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prisoner commits suicide in custody.' As a general rule, jailers can be held
liable for an inmate's suicide only when the inmate has previously attempted
suicide or expressed an intention to commit suicide. 5 If the jailer knows the
inmate to be suicidal, whether the jailer's conduct displayed deliberate
indifference to the inmate's psychiatric needs is often a question for the trier
of fact. 86
Because the standard for determining whether an inmate suicide was the
result of a constitutional violation is somewhat undefined, the standard for
determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity often blurs
the distinction between the merits and qualified immunity.A7 In Greason v.
Kemp,88 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial
of summary judgment to two prison physicians.89 Although the facts were

not in dispute, the court determined that a reasonable juror could conclude
from those facts that the defendants displayed deliberate indifference to the
suicidal decedent's psychiatric needs.' The issue in Greason turned on the
differing expert opinions concerning the defendant's responsibilities.9
Because the expert testimony could be the basis for substantive liability, the
defendants were not able to obtain summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity.
In Gordon v. Kidd,92 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that summary judgment is not appropriate "even when there is no dispute as
to the evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom." 93 In affirming the denial of summary judgment on behalf of one
defendant, the court determined that "the district court properly concluded
that the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from the facts did not establish
as a matter of law that [his] conduct was objectively reasonable." 94 Thus,
in order for an individual defendant to obtain summary judgment on the basis
84. See, e.g., Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1097 (4th Cir. 1992); Edwards v. Gilbert,
867 F.2d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 1989).
85. See Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1544-45 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
no individual liability if inmate had never shown indication of suicidal tendency).
86. See Gordon, 971 F.2d at 1097; Greason, 891 F.2d at 835 (citing Waldrop v. Evans, 871
F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).
87. Greason, 891 F.2d at 841-42 (Edmonson, J., dissenting) ("The merits of plaintiff's case
and the question of qualified immunity are separate questions; we must avoid allowing the ideas
to be blurred.").
88. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 840.
90. Id. at 835 (citing Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033).
91. See id. at 842 (Edmonson, J., dissenting) (reasoning that qualified immunity should not
be defeated by the plaintiff's production of an expert opinion on the defendant's conduct).
92. 971 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 1093 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.
1979)).
94. Id. at 1097. The court reversed the denial of summary judgment as to the other
defendants because the court concluded that they were not "deliberately indifferent" to the
decedent's psychiatric needs. Id. at 1095. Thus, these defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because they had no substantive liability.
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of qualified immunity, he must prove that there was no violation of the
plaintiff's rights as a matter of law.
Other courts have applied a similar standard-i.e., could a jury find the
defendant liable on the merits-when deciding a motion for summary
judgment concerning whether an individual defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. 95 Although the Eighth Circuit has stated that "to provide its
fullest and best use, qualified immunity ideally is addressed by summary
judgment," 96 the same opinion granted the defendants qualified immunity
because there was in effect no constitutional violation. 97 Thus, a prison
guard would be entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity only if
the plaintiff fails "to adduce any evidence to lead a reasonable juror to infer
that [the defendant] had actual knowledge, or willfully blinded himself, to the
unusual and large possibility that [the inmate] would commit suicide.""8
Toward a Solution
As Judge Edmonson of the Eleventh Circuit has noted, if qualified
immunity were available only when a jury could not find a constitutional tort,
the doctrine of qualified immunity would be superfluous.' Qualified
immunity is meaningful only if it shields government officials from trial and
liability when they would otherwise be liable. This is not to say that qualified
immunity is necessarily desirable, but that in many situations qualified
immunity does not meet its putative objective: allowing government officials
to function without undue fear of liability or litigation.
When the facts are not in dispute, but only the inferences to be drawn
from those facts, summary judgment may be appropriate on the issue of
qualified immunity if not on the merits. Even if the judge has no role to play
in resolving the facts, any doubt concerning the legality of a defendant's
conduct should be resolved in favor of the defendant on the issue of qualified
immunity."° In the case of a prison suicide or a search or arrest without
probable cause, liability necessarily means that the official acted with
deliberate indifference (suicide) or unreasonably (lack of probable cause).
95. See, e.g., Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1993); Bowen v. City of
Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1992); Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d 709, 717 (6th
Cir. 1992); Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1544-45 (11th Cir. 1992); Rellergert
v. Cape Girardeau County, 924 F.2d 794, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1991); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d
32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990).
96. Rellergert, 924 F.2d at 796.
97. Id. at 797 (holding defendants' actions "cannot be said to have been known to them as
deliberately indifferent").
98. Bowen, 966 F.2d at 17.
99. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 841 (lth Cir. 1990) (Edmonson, J., dissenting).
100. See Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (when reasonable minds
could differ, the summary judgment balance should favor the party claiming qualified immunity).
Even in Ellis, however, the court determined that the case should go to the jury even though it
did not "foreclose the possibility that Wynalda did not use excessive force." Id. at 247. The jury
was thus left to determine whether the officer's actions were "reasonable."
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Thus, one could argue that an officer who displays deliberate indifference to
an inmate's medical needs cannot claim qualified immunity.' The same
argument can be made with respect to an officer who makes an unreasonable
search or arrest.' 2 Because determinations of probable cause are difficult,
however, an officer can act objectively reasonably even though he is in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 The standard for determining
deliberate indifference is similarly vague. Individuals should not be held
personally liable for actions that, in hindsight, are found to violate the
constitution if fair doubt about the constitutionality of their actions existed at
the time.'14
Greason v. Kemp'0 5 and Gordon v. Kidd0 6 are examples of the situa-

tion in which hindsight prevents a defendant from claiming qualified
immunity on a motion for summary judgment. In Greason, the court relied
on the plaintiff's expert to determine that a trier-of-fact could conclude that

the defendant physicians were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's

psychiatric needs because they provided sufficiently inadequate psychiatric

care."0 7 Just as the experts in Greason disagreed about whether the defen-

dants' conduct constituted deliberate indifference, reasonable physicians could
disagree. Thus, how could the defendants have violated a clearly established
right if it is not clear that they violated the plaintiff's rights at all?
In Gordon v. Kidd, another suicide case, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
denial of summary judgment as to some defendants because the court

concluded on the evidence that they were not deliberately indifferent.0 3 As

101. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 57-58 (1989)
(deliberate conduct should not allow a defendant to rely on qualified immunity).
102. See Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L. J. 447, 460 (1978) ("Surely the
officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause for an unlawful arrest, for an
unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent police officer could not reasonably
believe that there was probable cause."). The argument also arises in cases involving police
officers' use of excessive force. See, e.g., Guffey v. Wyatt, 1994 WL 70532, at *4 (10th Cir.
Mar. 9, 1994) ("[i]f a plaintiff alleges a police officer has used excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, the qualified immunity inquiry becomes indistinguishable from the
merits of the underlying action"). But see Ellis, 999 F.2d at 246 n.2 (when reasonable minds
could differ, the balance favors the movant in the qualified immunity context even though the
balance would favor the plaintiff on the underlying claim).
103. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
104. Cf. Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991) (holding that the issue is whether the
defendants acted reasonably under settled law, not whether, in hindsight, the defendants could
have been more reasonable).
105. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
106. 971 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1992).
107. Greason, 891 F.2d at 835. The dissent contended that the right to be free from
inadequate psychiatric care was not clearly established until this case. Id. at 841 (Edmonson, J.,
dissenting). For purposes of the summary judgment standard, this article addresses the situation
in which the law was clearly established at the time of the incident, but the issue remained for
the jury whether the defendants' conduct violated that clearly established law.
108. Gordon, 971 F.2d at 1095.
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to the remaining defendant, the court affirmed the denial of summary
judgment because the facts-which were not in great dispute, and the
inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, did not establish as a matter
of law that defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable." ° In order to
obtain summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, the defendant
must prove as a matter of law that there was no constitutional violation. Any
doubt about the matter would be resolved against the defendant; he would
have to go through the expense and diversion of official energy related to a
trial.
With respect to cases involving alleged violations of the Fourth
Amendment, there is similarly sometimes no distinction between liability on
the merits and qualified immunity. In Mahoney v. Kesery,110 Judge Posner,
writing for the court, stated that there the issue of immunity and the merits
were one and the same."' In so doing, the court stated that an officer
cannot reasonably believe his actions to be reasonable if they are, in fact,
unreasonable."' In Golino v. City of New Haven,"' a defendant charged
with making an arrest without probable cause did not get summary judgment
on the issue of qualified immunity because the court could not rule as a
matter of law that his actions were objectively reasonable. 4 In the Second
Circuit, an officer moving for summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity must adduce facts so that no reasonable jury could conclude it
unreasonable for the officer to believe probable cause existed.115 As in the
suicide cases, any doubt about the legality of the action-even on undisputed
facts-is resolved against the defendant. The defendant would win a motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity only if there was no possible
liability on the merits.
PROPOSAL

Undisputed Evidentiary Facts
The defense of qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." ' 6 With
respect to probable cause determinations, if officers of reasonable compe-

109. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
110. 976 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
111. Id.at 1057.
112. Id.at 1058.
113. 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992).
114. Id. at 870.
115. Id. at 870 (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Frank
v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1328 (2d Cir. 1993).
116. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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tence could disagree, immunity should be recognized." 7 Therefore, if

reasonable jurors, with the benefit of hindsight and time, could disagree, the
officer should be entitled to the shield of immunity. This should be true in
all cases involving the defense of qualified immunity, including prison
suicides. When the facts are not in dispute, but a reasonable finder of fact
would not necessarily find a constitutional violation from those facts, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
To give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, on a motion for summary
judgment when the evidentiary facts are not in dispute, the defendant should
be entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation (as the law existed at the time of the violation) as a matter of
law. The defendant loses his shield of immunity not when the plaintiff can
create a question about which reasonable minds could differ, but when the
facts are sufficiently egregious so that reasonable minds, including the
defendant's, could not differ as to the legality of the defendant's actions. If
the court denies summary judgment, the plaintiff would necessarily be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits."
Disputed Facts
If the facts are in dispute, the inquiry generally revolves around whether,
under the plaintiff's version of the facts, the defendant's conduct violated a
clearly established constitutional right." 9 Thus, if the law is clearly
established that a law enforcement officer must seek a warrant for arrest if
he has ample opportunity to procure a warrant, the defendant cannot prevail
on a motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff produces evidence that the
defendant had ample time to procure a warrant." In this situation, the
defendant will have to go to trial, thereby effectively losing any immunity
because the immunity question will rise and fall with the jury's determination
on the merits.
In some circumstances, a genuine dispute as to the facts will preclude
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. If the facts are in
dispute, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
should have to produce evidence that, if uncontroverted, would support
judgment as a matter of law as the law existed at the time of the alleged
violation.' 2' If the plaintiff's evidence would be sufficient simply to create

117. Id.; see also id. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(because reasonable officers could disagree, the defendant should not have to go to trial).
118. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 545 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
("[A] necessary implication of a holding that Mitchell was not entitled to qualified immunity
would be a holding that he is indeed liable.").
119. See, e.g., Herren v. Bowyer, 850 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1988).
120. Id.
121. This is the same standard as should apply in cases in which the evidentiary facts are
not in dispute.
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a question for the trier of fact as to the merits, the defendant should be
entitled to summary judgment because reasonable minds could differ as to the
legality of defendant's conduct. If the plaintiff produces evidence from which
no reasonable juror could conclude the defendant's actions to be lawful under
then existing law," the motion for summary judgment should be denied
because in such a situation, the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity
requires findings of fact.
If the court denies summary judgment to the defendant because the
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact on
qualified immunity, the defendant has effectively lost much of the protection
of qualified immunity. Nonetheless, the standard for summary judgment
precludes the court from preventing the case from going to trial because the
court may not resolve genuine issues of material fact on a motion for
summary judgment." The defendant should nonetheless be allowed at trial
to raise the defense of qualified immunity. Some courts apparently disagree
with this proposition. 4 If the defendant cannot raise the defense of
qualified immunity at trial, he risks having judgment entered against him on
the merits even if the evidence at trial fails to show that the defendant
violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have
known, but merely creates a question for the jury concerning liability.
To avoid this potential unfairness, the court must determine whether the
evidence adduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law as the law
existed at the time of the alleged violation; if not, the judge should enter
judgment based on qualified immunity. The problem arises if the evidence
of whether defendant's conduct was egregious enough to violate a clearly
established constitutional right remains disputed at the end of the trial .1
There are a number of possibilities in this situation: the judge could resolve
the factual disputes that concern qualified immunity, the jury could
resolve-with special interrogatories-the factual issues about both qualified
immunity and the merits, the jury could resolve the merits without any
consideration of qualified immunity, or the jury could be instructed only on
qualified immunity.

122. Cf. Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (1D.C. Cir. 1993) ("a defendant's motion
for summary judgment is to be denied only when, viewing the facts in the record and all
reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable
jury could conclude that the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no reasonable officer
could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions"). This standard, however, falls short in a
situation in which a question exists for the jury as to whether the force was unduly excessive.
123. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
124. See, e.g., Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991). ("[Once the
defense of qualified immunity has been denied pretrial due to disputed issues of material facts,

the jury should determine the factual issues without any mention of qualified immunity."). But
see supra note 78.
125. That is, the plaintiffs evidence, if uncontroverted, would entitle the plaintiff to
judgment as a matter of law, but the evidence is contradicted by defendant's evidence.
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The first three of these possibilities have problems. To allow the judge
to make the factual determination would make the judge and the jury both
triers-of-fact, which would give the defendant two bites at the apple. 2 ' To
allow the jury to determine both the issue of qualified immunity and liability
risks confusing the jury. The jury would potentially have to apply different
legal standards if the law that would apply at time of trial was not clearly
established at the time of the incident. To allow the matter to go to the jury
without regard to qualified immunity would allow defendants to be held
liable for conduct that did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.
This would inhibit the ability of these government officials to perform their
official duties.127
The best alternative is to leave the issue of qualified immunity to the
jury, which would protect the potential immunity of the defendant and the
plaintiff's right to vindication. Although there is the danger of confusing the
issues, the court can reduce this possibility by submitting specific interrogatories to the jury to determine whether the jury found the facts as would be
necessary to defeat the defense of qualified immunity.'2 The better
alternative, however, would be to bifurcate the trial to allow the jury to
determine the facts concerning qualified immunity. If the jury finds for any
defendant concerning qualified immunity, the case is over with respect to that
defendant because that defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity. If
the jury finds against any defendant on the issue of qualified immunity-i.e.,
that the defendant's actions clearly violated the plaintiffs constitutional
rights, the court would then enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff against
that defendant. The court could then conclude the trial on the merits with
respect to any remaining defendants who did not, or could not, 29 raise the
qualified immunity defense.
Criticism
This proposal is not without its criticism. By definition, qualified
immunity "directly limits individual liability for Constitutional violations by

126. The law could require the judge to determine, at the close of the evidence, whether the
plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct violated a
clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known; if so,
the defendant would not be entitled to qualified immunity. Normally, the merits should then be
submitted to the jury. In that situation, however, the judge would have ruled as a factual matter
that the defendant should be liable. To submit the matter to the jury risks the possibility of
inconsistent findings. To allow the judge to enter judgment on the merits would make the jury
superfluous.
127. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
128. The court must determine the state of the law and what facts would entitle the plaintiff
to judgment as a matter of law, i.e., facts upon which reasonable minds could not disagree that
there was a constitutional violation.
129. For example, municipal defendants may not assert qualified immunity. See Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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denying a damage remedy for conduct that violates the constitution." 3 '
However, in order to be meaningful, qualified immunity must give protection
to individuals who would otherwise be liable.' 3' This proposal seeks only
to make the doctrine of qualified immunity achieve its stated objectives of
shielding government officials from liability to allow them to perform their
discretionary functions effectively. Whether maintaining the defense of
qualified immunity to constitutional torts is good policy is not an issue this
article addresses.
A second criticism is that if the court grants qualified immunity pretrial,
it would avoid ruling on the merits. Thus, courts might not create many new
clearly established rights. 32 This would not necessarily be true in the two
situations discussed above. With respect to Fourth Amendment rights,
criminal defendants routinely challenge searches and seizures on motions to
suppress evidence without respect to qualified immunity. With respect to the
prison suicide cases, the argument holds more water because the only way
in which the law could become clearly established would be through civil
suits in which the individual defendants could raise qualified immunity.
Nonetheless, in cases in which the facts are sufficiently egregious, the
defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity even if there are no cases
addressing that exact set of facts.' 33 Although municipalities cannot be held
liable through respondeat superior," 4 they are not entitled to qualified
immunity. 3 ' Thus, law concerning the operation of prisons continues to be
established. Furthermore, the defense of qualified immunity bars only
monetary relief, not declaratory or injunctive relief.'3
CONCLUSION

On a motion for summary judgment concerning qualified immunity, the
court should consider evidence with respect to qualified immunity differently
than with respect to the merits. Even if the plaintiff produces sufficient
evidence to create a jury question on the merits, the defendant should be
entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to
support a judgment as a matter of law against the defendant-i.e., sufficient
to show that the defendant violated a clearly established right of which a
reasonable person would have known.
130. Rudovsky, supra note 101, at 27.
131. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 841 (1lth Cir. 1990) (Edmonson, J.,dissenting).
132. See Rudovsky, supra note 101, at 53-56.
133. See, e.g., Lewis v. Parish of Terrebone, 894 F.2d 142, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1990) ("One
need not find a goose case' to imbue a warden at a jail with a constitutional duty to protect a
risoner prone to suicide from self-destruction."); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (to determine what a reasonable person should know, "it is not
necessary to point to a precedent which is factually on all-fours with the case at bar").
134. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
135. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 625 (1980).
136. E.g., Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 957 (1st Cir. 1991).
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If the ruling on the issue of qualified immunity mimics the ruling on the
merits, the defense of qualified immunity is superfluous because it would be
available only when the plaintiff would be unable to prove liability. The only
protection left to the defendant is the ability to file an interlocutory appeal to
argue that the plaintiff would be unable to prove liability on the merits.
Because qualified immunity should be denied only when the plaintiff can
prove as a matter of law that the defendant violated a constitutional right, the
merits should never become an issue with respect to that defendant. If the
defendant loses qualified immunity, he would necessarily be liable on the
merits.
By making qualified immunity the only issue, the court can focus the
litigation so that qualified immunity can serve its purpose of protecting
officials from the injustice of subjecting them to liability in the absence of
bad faith and the diversion of official energy associated with defending a
lawsuit. Thus, qualified immunity would truly be a shield to all but the truly
incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.
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